WebWhen a prisoners' dilemma game is repeated a finite number of times (T) A. cooperation unravels during the first round of the game, resulting in the static game Nash equilibrium. … WebMore than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience–as suggested by backward induction–remains inconclusive. This paper provides a meta-analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate ...
Revealed Reputations in the Finitely-Repeated Prisoners’ …
WebFeb 5, 2024 · In the finite repeated prisoner's dilemma the strategy for both always cheat the other prisoner is a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Is there any other Nash equlibrium … WebFeb 7, 2024 · In the present study, we analytically study zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated (two-person) prisoner's dilemma games with a general payoff matrix. Our results are as follows. First, we present the forms of solutions that extend the known results for infinitely repeated games (with a discount factor w of unity) to the case of ... elevage chow chow nord pas de calais
Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated ...
Web2 Finitely Repeated Games These games represent the case of a fixed time horizon T<∞. Repeated games allow players to condition their actions on the way their opponents behave in previous periods. We begin the one of the most famous examples, the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The stage game is shown in Fig. 1 (p. 5). WebWe investigate the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with explicit contractual devices. We show that full collusion can be achieved by incentivizing the players' final period of play with small ... WebJan 1, 1985 · Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is justified, without departure from strict utility maximization or complete information, but under the assumption that there are bounds (possibly very large) to the complexity of the strategies that the players may use. Economics Letters 19 (1985) 227-229 227 North-Holland BOUNDED ... footerbuilding.com